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SUPPRESSION OF SPEECH FROM
GOVERNMENT SUPPORT OF SPEECH
ARNOLD H. LOEWY*
INTRODUCTION
It is occasionally argued that governmental limitations on
support of speech-including the expression of groups that the
government chooses to support with public funds, such as nonprofit
organizations-should be the same as governmental limitations on
forbidding speech, namely that content must be irrelevant. It is the thesis
of this paper that approaching free speech in this manner ultimately
would be destructive of free speech and that, in the long run, speech will
be subject to greater limitations if it is rejected than if that congruity is
maintained.
I start with the proposition that free trade in ideas should be
absolute. As the Supreme Court put it in Gertz v. Robert Welch, Inc.
1:
"[T]here is no such thing as a false idea."2 A corollary to this proposition
is that no harm that comes from a false idea can count as harm. So, for
example, if some commentator were to write, "Any law professor who
thinks that free trade in ideas is constitutionally protected is a stupid
jerk," the actual harm that commentator caused could not count as
actionable harm.
I might read such inflammatory nonsense and be terribly
offended. It might even cause me to lose sleep, eventually productivity,
and ultimately health. Nevertheless, I could not sue because the
. George Killam Professor of Criminal Law Texas Tech School of Law and
Graham Kenan Professor of Law Emeritus at the University of North Carolina
School of Law.
1. 418 U.S. 323 (1974).
2. Id. at 339 (alteration added).
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commentator would be entitled to express her own views, however
horrible and distasteful I might find them.
Unfortunately, the Court has not always adhered to the above-
stated proposition. It has carved out an area of sexually explicit speech
that it calls obscenity, and it has refused to offer constitutional protection
thereto.3  To be sure, the Court partially defends its treatment of
obscenity on the grounds that it is not ideological. 4 'However, it could
not be clearer that the strongest proponents of anti-obscenity legislation
support it on the ground that the American citizenry should not be
subject to the licentious ideas presented in this despicable material.
For this reason, I have argued elsewhere that the "obscenity is
5not speech" doctrine should be overruled. For now, however, my
concern is narrower. I fear that treating denial of government largess as
substantially equivalent to prohibiting the speech will cause the Court to
broaden, rather than to narrow, the category of obscenity.
Consider the examples most frequently cited. An artist named
Andres Serrano immerses a cross in a bottle of urine and calls it Piss
Christ. Another artist named Robert Mapplethorpe produces a series of
homoerotic photographs: Both artists are awarded funding from the
National Endowment for the Arts. Unsurprisingly, taxpayers are
67furious. While these works of art' are and should be constitutionally
3. See, e.g., Miller v. California, 413 U.S. 15 (1973) (defining three criteria
that must be met in order for material to be designated as constitutionally
unprotected obscenity); Roth v. United States, 354 U.S. 476 (1957) (clarifying the
definition of obscenity and reaffirming that it does not receive First Amendment
protection).
4. Roth, 354 U.S. at 484 ("All ideas having even the slightest redeeming social
importance .. .have the full protection of the guaranties .... But implicit in the
history of the First Amendment is the rejection of obscenity as utterly without
redeeming social importance.").
5. Arnold Loewy, Obscenity: An Outdated Concept for the Twenty-First
Century, 10 NEXUS 21, 22 (2005) (arguing that case law that has arisen since Miller
is capable of dealing with harm caused by sexually explicit speech because of its
manner of dissemination and that Miller is both no longer useful in curbing social
harms and "antithetical to sound First Amendment theory").
6. See, e.g., Elizabeth Kastor, Congress Bars Funding for 'Obscene' Art;
Senate Vote Sends Measure to Bush, WASH. POST, Oct. 8, 1989, at A21 (discussing
the bill passed by Congress to limit funding of "obscene" art by the NEA).
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protected, their entitlement to taxpayer support is quite another matter.
Once they are supported, taxpayer protests reach a crescendo, and a call
is made to ban the art.
Although these examples sound familiar to the readers of
National Endowment for the Arts v. Finley8-in which legislation arising
out of the Serrano/Mapplethorpe controversy was challenged as
unconstitutional-the much earlier case of Southeastern Promotions,
Ltd. v. Conrad first created the issue confusion.
I. CONRAD
The issue in Conrad was whether the City of Chattanooga was
compelled to license the rock musical Hair to play in a city-owned
auditorium that was maintained for "clean, healthful, entertainment."'
0
The lower court had held that because Hair was obscene, Chattanooga
was not required to license it."
The Supreme Court reversed on the ground that the United States
Court of Appeals for the Sixth Circuit had asked the wrong question.
This was the good news. The bad news was that the Supreme Court's
question was at least as wrong as the one asked by the lower court.
The Sixth Circuit's conclusion that Hair was obscene seems
certainly wrong. This was a nationally prominent play that almost surely
had serious literary, artistic, and political value. 2  Consequently, if
obscenity were the standard, Chattanooga should have lost its case. But
obscenity should not have been the question. Rather, the question should
have been whether Chattanooga was free to reserve one of its theaters for
7. Personally I have difficulty finding anything artistic (as opposed to
insulting) in Serrano's work, but because I'm no art critic, for the purposes of this
paper, I will assume that it really is art.
8. 524 U.S. 569 (1998).
9. 420 U.S. 546 (1975).
10. Id. at 549 n.4.
11. Se. Promotions, Ltd. v. Conrad, 486 F.2d 894, 894 (6th Cir. 1973).
12. I confess that I have not personally seen Hair, but based on the
descriptions that I have read, it is highly unlikely that the play would be found
obscene at the Supreme Court level. Cf Jenkins v. Georgia, 418 U.S. 153 (1974)
(holding that no jury could validly find the critically acclaimed movie Carnal
Knowledge to be obscene).
2007]
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clean, wholesome family entertainment and to reject Hair on the ground
that it didn't meet those criteria.
In my view, the answer to the question that the Court should
have asked is "yes." There is all the difference in the world between
condemning a movie or play as "obscene"-thus precluding it from
being shown anywhere in the city-and describing it as unwholesome
and thus unfit to appear in a city auditorium reserved for wholesome
entertainment.
Unfortunately, Justice Rehnquist' 3 was the only Justice who
actually understood the issue. The majority of Justices thought that the
issue was whether Chattanooga provided for a hearing to determine
obscenity in a prompt manner as required by Freedman v. Maryland.
14
Obviously, that question would have been relevant only if obscenity had
been the sole basis for denying an invitation to Southeastern Promotions
to present Hair in the municipal theater. The question could plausibly
have been whether there was an expedited hearing to determine if Hair
was clean, wholesome family entertainment-but that was neither what
Southeastern Promotions wanted nor what it got.
Conrad is a classic example of the harm done by conflating
government-suppression issues with government-support issues.
Undoubtedly, the Sixth Circuit did not want to force Chattanooga to
book an unwholesome production in its theater designed for wholesome
productions, but the only way it could see to accomplish that goal was to
declare Hair obscene. Thus, in order to preserve Chattanooga's
wholesome theater, the Court gave Chattanooga the power to preclude
even private theaters from showing the play. Courts need to be more
sensitive than to render such overkill decisions. Clearly understanding
the differences between freedom from suppression and freedom to be
supported would surely help.
Fortunately, in Arkansas Educational Television Commission v.
Forbes,15 the Supreme Court recognized the distinction between
13. As he then was; Conrad, 420 U.S. at 570 (Rehnquist, J., dissenting).
14. 380 U.S. 51, 58-59 (1965) (holding that "a noncriminal process which
requires the prior submission of a film to a censor avoids constitutional infirmity
only if it takes place under procedural safeguards designed to obviate the dangers of
a censorship system" and defining two such safeguards).
15. 523 U.S. 666 (1998).
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government support and government prohibition. Forbes involved an
Arkansas public television station that wished to conduct a debate among
viable candidates for a congressional seat. The station chose to include
only the Republican and Democratic candidates for the seat, concluding
that Forbes, the independent candidate, was not viable.
Forbes did not take too kindly to this snub and filed suit,
claiming (not unlike Southeastern Promotions did two decades earlier)
that he was denied access to a public forum. Fortunately, the Court ruled
that although Forbes had an unbridled right to speak, he did not have a
right to be included in the television station's debate. Rather, the state
could use its own editorial judgment in deciding which candidates were
viable, and it could limit the debate to the two that it considered viable.
It is certainly not clear that Forbes portends a rethinking of
Conrad. Conrad was not even mentioned in the opinion, and the cases
might well be distinguishable. Nevertheless, it is refreshing to hear the
Court clearly articulate the principle that the standard that controls
government prohibition does not also control Government support.
II. FINLEY
In National Endowment for the Arts v. Finley,'6 the Court
reviewed the Ninth Circuit's finding that section 954(d)(1) of the
National Foundation on the Arts and Humanities Act of 1965 consisted
of an impermissible viewpoint-based restriction and was
unconstitutionally vague. The section at issue, which came into being
after Congress amended the Act amid the controversy that was swirling
around Serrano's and Mapplethorpe's NEA-supported projects,
7
requires the Endowment's Chairperson to ensure that "artistic excellence
and artistic merit are the criteria by which [grant] applications are
judged, taking into consideration general standards of decency and
respect for the diverse beliefs and values of the American public."'
' 8
In the majority opinion, Justice O'Connor wrote that because
section 954(d)(1) requires "the NEA only to take 'decency and respect'
16. 524 U.S. 569, 572-73 (1998).
17. Id. at 574-76.
18. Id. at 572 (alteration added).
20071
FIRST AMENDMENT LA W REVIEW
into consideration and that the legislation was aimed at reforming
procedures rather than precluding speech," the argument that the section
would be used for invidious viewpoint discrimination lacked merit.1
9
Noting that the section "merely adds some imprecise considerations to an
already subjective selection process," the Court held that it was not
20
facially impermissible.
I probably agree with Justice Scalia, who, in concurrence, wrote
that the NEA's suggested method of compliance with section
954(d)(l)-the selection of "diverse review panels" reflecting many
"geographic and cultural perspectives"-was clearly inadequate. 21 The
statute requires that decency be considered, but it is not clear to me how
having diverse review panels would guarantee that decency would be
considered, i.e. deemed relevant. More importantly, however, both
Scalia and O'Connor, whose opinions taken together stand for the
proposition that government support of speech is not to be governed by
the same standards as government prohibition of speech, represent the
majority of the Court.
In some ways the real question in Finley perhaps should have
been whether the NEA is constitutional at all. It always makes its
decisions based on content. How could it do so otherwise? Obviously,
the First Amendment forbids such things if we're talking about
regulation. For the reasons given thus far, I would allow content
discrimination in regard to NEA awards.
Unfortunately, viewpoint discrimination might be inevitable.
Suppose, for example, that I seek support for my absolutely brilliant
satirical destruction of George W. Bush. Suppose further that most of
the NEA's panel members are supporters of Bush. Can I sue when my
brilliant satire gets passed over in favor of a much more pedestrian satire
about Bill Clinton? I think not, but if my conclusion is correct, clearly
the NEA can practice viewpoint discrimination unencumbered by the
Constitution.
Assuming that the NEA is constitutional in the abstract, I believe
that Scalia has to be right as a matter of constitutional law. The NEA by
19. Id. at 582.
20. Id. at 590.
21. Id. at 591 (Scalia, J., concurring)
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its nature, as illustrated in the above paragraph, inherently engages in
viewpoint discrimination even though it might not be aware of what it is
doing. I do not believe that taking the next step of overtly supporting
certain viewpoints is an unconstitutional one.22
III. AMERICAN LIBRARY ASSOCIATION
United States v. American Library Association, Inc., saw the
Court examine whether provisions of the Children's Internet Protection
Act23 spurred public libraries to infringe upon their patrons' First
24
Amendment rights. Under the Act, a public library may not receive
federal aid to provide Internet access to patrons unless it has a policy of
online safety for minors that includes the use of an Internet block or filter
to guard against access to "visual depictions" involving obscenity, child
,,25
pornography, or other material that is "harmful to minors. A
collection of "libraries, library associations, library patrons, and Web site
26
publishers" challenged the filtering stipulations' constitutionality.
The Court decided that Congress legitimately could demand that
the federal funds, which were supposed "to help public libraries fulfill
their traditional role of obtaining material of requisite and appropriate
quality for educational and informational purposes," be spent for such
27intended purposes. Congress' imposed limitation was permissible also
22. Cf Rust v. Sullivan, 500 U.S. 173 (1991) (upholding a limitation on
doctors receiving federal funding from discussing the abortion alternative with their
patients). I do not believe that the statement in the text is or should be without
limits. Funding only pro-Christian speech would probably violate the Establishment
Clause. Funding only pro-Republican speech would probably violate the Equal
Protection Clause. Funding only lawyers who don't make certain arguments on
behalf of their clients would seem to violate the Sixth Amendment. Cf Legal Serv.
Corp. v. Velazquez, 531 U.S. 533 (2001) (holding that the funding condition limiting
arguments legal services lawyers can make on behalf of their welfare clients violated
the First Amendment).
23. Children's Internet Protection Act (CIPA), Pub. L. No. 106-554, 114 Stat.
2763A-335 (2000) (codified at 20 U.S.C. § 9134(f) (2000) and 47 U.S.C. § 254(h)
(2000).
24. 539 U.S. 194 (2003).
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because public libraries traditionally have kept pornographic material out
of their other collections and because filtering software clearly assists the
28government's Internet assistance programs, the Court stated.
On balance, I believe that this case was correctly decided. First,arewtbohtepuaiys •.29 3
I agree with both the plurality's opinion and Justice Stevens' dissent
3
0
that patrons do not have a First Amendment right to view anything they
want at a library. Certainly, if I want one of my books3' in the library, I
have no right to make the librarian put it there. And, if I were a patron, I
would have no right to have the librarian make it available to me.
The next question is whether public librarians as state actors
have a First Amendment right to control the contents of their libraries.
Obviously, the question to contemplate is: Do public libraries belong to
the librarians, or do librarians merely serve as stewards over institutions
that actually belong to the government? We don't have to resolve this
question to conclude that American Library Association was correctly
decided.
Assuming that librarians do have First Amendment rights, they
can certainly choose to relinquish them in exchange for a bargain rate on
materials. So, the question becomes: Can the federal government give a
library a bargain rate on computer services (unavailable to the rank-and-
file citizen) on the condition that the library block certain sites? The
Court correctly concluded that "yes" was the appropriate answer to that
question.
In analyzing this question, one should carefully note the
congruity between the governmental largess and the limitation on use.
For example, if the statute had stated, "Either you block Internet access
or we will no longer help buy you books," it would have been a different
case. Put differently, government purchases of compliance should be
28. Id. at 212.
29. Id. at 204 ("Although [public libraries] seek to provide a wide array of
information, their goal has never been to provide 'universal coverage.' Instead,
public libraries seek to provide materials 'that would be of the greatest direct benefit
or interest to the community."' (alteration added) (citations omitted)).
30. Id. at 226 (Stevens, J., dissenting) ("[W]e have always assumed that
libraries have discretion when making decisions regarding what to include in, and
exclude from, their collections." (alteration added)).
31. ARNOLD H. LOEWY, CRIMINAL LAW IN A NUTSHELL (4th ed. 2003).
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directly related to the expenditure. In American Library Association,
they were.
CONCLUSION
It is the thesis of this essay that government should never be free
to censor speech. It should, however, be free to get its money's worth
out of expenditures it makes. Thus, if a city builds a civic center for a
particular kind of entertainment, it should be able to limit the
entertainment to that for which the center was built. Similarly, if it
wishes to pay for developing certain types of artists, then only those
types of artists need apply. Also, when it pays for computers or
computer access in libraries, it should be able to limit access to such
technology congruent with its purposes.
For the most part, the Court's decisions since the ill-starred
Conrad case have gotten it right. Let us hope (but not hold our breath)
that this translates into the eventual abolition of the obscenity doctrine.
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